Toward an RSU-unavailable lightweight certificateless key agreement scheme for VANETs by Song, Jun et al.
Toward an RSU-unavailable lightweight certificateless 
key agreement scheme for VANETs 
 
J. Song, C. He, L. Zhang, Shanyu Tang, and H. Zhang 
 
Abstract 
Vehicle ad-hoc networks have developed rapidly these years, whose security and 
privacy issues are always concerned widely. In spite of a remarkable research on their 
security solutions, but in which there still lacks considerations on how to secure 
vehicle-to-vehicle communications, particularly when infrastructure is unavailable. In 
this paper, we propose a lightweight certificate less and one-round key agreement 
scheme without pairing, and further prove the security of the proposed scheme in the 
random oracle model. The proposed scheme is expected to not only resist known 
attacks with less computation cost, but also as an efficient way to relieve the workload 
of vehicle-to-vehicle authentication, especially in no available infrastructure 
circumstance. A comprehensive evaluation, including security analysis, efficiency 
analysis and simulation evaluation, is presented to confirm the security and feasibility 
of the proposed scheme. 
Keywords: vehicle ad-hoc network; security and privacy; lightweight authentication; 
certificateless key agreement 
 
I. Introduction 
Vehicle ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have got unprecedented attentions from both 
industry and academia in these years. Dedicate Short Range Communications (OSRC) 
and Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAV E) in 802.11p [1], through 
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications at 5.9 
GHz, enable a self-organizing, easy deployment, low cost, open architecture of mobile 
ad-hoc network. We can expect that vehicular networks applications and value-added 
service will play an even more important role in easing traffic pressure, in- creasing 
the driving comfort, avoiding traffic accidents, online payment and online 
infotainment, etc. It is well known that vehicular networks are unique features in the 
following two aspects, namely the dynamic network topology and the short-range and 
unstable communication environment. Thus it may not be desirable or feasible to 
simply utilize those existing solutions to handle with VANET security issues. 
 
Due to the mobile and dynamic topology nature, vehicular networks have brought 
some challenging security and privacy issues that still remain to be addressed. 
Although there is a remarkable research for VANET key agreement solutions in the 
literature, the previous work did not specifically optimize the security 
implementations considering the properties of infrastructure inaccessible scenarios. 
For instance, in areas where traffic is concentrated, the distribution of infrastructures 
is generally intensive and well-organized so that vehicles can mutually authenticate in 
real-time online methods. However, in places where infrastructures are sparsely 
deployed or infrastructures cannot be accessed, the method of online authentication 
does not work properly, such as highway environment, suburb, or disaster areas where 
infrastructures were destroyed. 
 To address the concerns, in this paper, we propose a secure lightweight certificateless 
authentication key agreement scheme (CL- AKA) especially for the purpose of 
securing V2V communication when without available road-side infrastructures. The 
main contributions of this study are threefold. First, we present a strong certificateless 
key agreement protocol following a practical approach and fully addressing the 
aforementioned security issues under a dynamic and insecure vehicular environment. 
Second, we implement one CL- AKA scheme and show its construction pro- cesses 
based on defined strong security model. Third, this paper gives the security proof of 
the proposed CL-AKA scheme and evaluates its performance through comparing with 
other schemes. Security analyses and performance results show that the proposed 
scheme is a well-optimized CL-PKA scheme whose efficiency and performance are 
advantageous for the V2V authentication communication scenarios. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews the related work. 
Section III describes the system model and the security model for VANETs. Section 
IV presents our security protocol. Followed by security analysis and performance 
results in section V, the last part is our further discussions and conclusion in section 
VI. 
 
II. Related Work 
 
Generally, there are mainly four kinds of key agreement scheme so far, that is, the 
tradition- al PKI-based or the Certificate (CA)-based key agreement schemes, the 
identification (ID)-based key agreement schemes [5,6], or others, including the 
certificateless public key agreement [2, 3], the Lite-CA based key agreement 
schemes[4], and the self-certificate public key based key agreement schemes. It is 
worth noting that CA-based key agreement scheme usually requires the attendance of 
a public key infrastructure. Besides that, the IO-based cryptosystem [5] often exists a 
key escrow issue. 
In 2005, AI-Riyami and Paterson [7] introduced a certificateless public-key 
encryption (CL-PKE) that gets rid of the requirement of public key infrastructure. 
Roughly speaking, it combines the ideas and methods from the traditional public key 
encryption and identity-based encryption. Distinguished from 10-based 
cryptosystems, user's partial private key originates from its own identity information 
and KGC, and a secret value generated by the user itself. In 2008, Dent [8], in one 
survey paper, notes that two obvious advantages of certificateless public key 
encryption scheme. First, it has no requirement of certificates, which is unlike a 
traditional public key encryption scheme. Furthermore, it voids the direct threat from 
attackers to compute the full private key. 
In 2009, Lippold et al. [3] proposed the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven 
secure in the random oracle model. This paper gives a detailed secure proof and a 
generic model to design a strong secure key agreement proto- col. However, its 
process of key agreement is complex and time-consuming with at least five modular 
exponentiation and ten bilinear pairing operations. In 2011, Yang et al. [9] proposed 
the first proven strongly secure CL-KE protocol without pairing. It requires less 
computation cost than Lippold’s scheme because of no expensive pairing operations. 
These certificateless key agreement schemes, in general, have three main secrets, that 
is, the ID-based key, the secret value and the ephemeral key. Both papers use the 
random oracle model to prove their security that, as long as one of the three secrets is 
unrevealed, the scheme is considered secure [3, 9]. However, these studies are not 
feasible in securing V2V communication when considering of less computation and 
communication overhead. 
Song et al. [2] proposed a strong certificateless key agreement protocol following a 
practical approach and fully addressing the  aforementioned security issues under 
common VANET attacks. This scheme has four rounds to achieve the three-way 
handshake.  Thus it is still inefficient for vehicle-to-vehicle key agreement 
communication. Dong and Cao [4] proposed an efficient lite-CA-based encryption 
scheme for data forwarding in VANETs. This proposed scheme has less 
computational over- head and provides an efficient way to relieve workload and 
deployment of certificates as well. 
Inspired by previous works, this paper pro- poses a certificateless key agreement 
scheme which is addressed in a dynamic and insecure vehicular environment, 
particularly for V2V authentication communication in the scenario without available 
road-side infrastructures. 
 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURE MODEL 
 
3.1 System model 
 
This paper addresses the VANETs scenario as Figure 1. As seen from the figure, there 
are usually three components: Regional Trusted Authority (RTA), Road Side Unit 
(RSU) and On Board Unit (OBU). In this paper, the main concern is the secure 
authentication key agreement communication between vehicles, as well as the 
registration before communication. 
 
 
Fig.1 System model 
 
a) RTA: is a regional trusted authority. There is usually only one RTA which is 
always trusted. In our system model, RTA has two main functions: one is that RTA 
computes the master key for the key agreement and publishes the requisite public 
parameters; the other is that when vehicles come into its communication range, RTA 
controls the registration pro- cess of vehicles and computes the pseudonym for 
vehicles. 
b) RSU: is a trusted roadside unit which connects with RTA through wired channel 
and communicates with  OBU  via  wireless   channel; meanwhile, it has a wireless 
Access Point (AP) for all OBUs in its communication range. RSUs have two roles, 
data warehouse and pro- cessing center authorized by CA. So RSUs are important to 
act as the secure proxy between RTA and OBU. They are generally deployed in an 
optimized way for high utilization due to their high cost. Therefore, once the RSUs 
are unavailable in some areas, the V21 communications will be invalid or infeasible. 
c)  OBU:  is deployed on the vehicles as a trusted platform module (TPM).  OBUs can 
communicate with RSUs through wireless channel. OBUs should register to RTA and 
obtain key materials in advance. Before OBUs communicate with each other, they 
exchange public keys and compute the session keys for encrypting the subsequent 
messages. 
 
3.2 Secure model 
 
Inspired  by  the  extended  Canetti-Krawcyzk (eCK)  model [ll],  this  paper  designs  
a  novel  lightweight  certificateless  key  agreement scheme  which  is provably  
secure  in  the  random oracle model. We present their cryptography properties as 
followings. 
The proposed scheme consists of the following probabilistic polynomial time 
algorithms: 
Setup(lk) : with the input of the security parameters k, it outputs the global parameters 
{g, q, G}  as well as the hash functions. 
MasterKeyGen(lk): with the k as the security parameter input, it returns the master 
private key s and the corresponding master public key S. 
ID-basedKeyGen(s, ID): with the input of the master private key s and the identity ID 
of a user, it returns the ID-based key dID of the user. 
SecretValueGen (1k): with the input of the security parameters k, it outputs the secret 
value Xi of user i. 
CertificatelessPublicKeyGen(xi): with the input of the secret value Xi of user i, it 
outputs the certificateless public key Xi.  
EphemeralKeyGen(1k) : with the input of the security parameters k, it outputs the 
ephemeral key ri and Ri of user i. 
SessionKeyGen(sid, pki, pkj, ski, skj): with the input of the parameters sid, pki' pkj' sk;, 
skj, where sid is the identity of the session, pki is the set of user i's public keys, pkj is 
the set of user j's public keys, Ski is the set of user i's private keys, skj is the set of 
user j's private keys, the algorithm outputs the session key SK between user i and}. 
Let U = U1, U2, U3, …, Un be a set of vehic1es. The protocol is run between any two 
of these vehicles. For each vehicle, an ID-based private key can be obtained from the 
RTA through a secure channel. Other keys, such as their secret value, ephemeral key 
and certificateless public key are generated by themselves. 
The adversary A has the ability to control the communication channel over which the 
vehicles exchange their messages. IT i,' j denotes the tth protocol session running 
between the user i and user}. In addition, the adversary is allowed to replace the 
certificate less public key unless the corresponding private key is unrevealed, and vice 
versa. A session IT i, 'j may enter an accepted state with having computed a session 
key S K;'J or terminate without entering into an accepted state. We assumed that the 
information that whether a session is terminated with entering into an accepted state 
or not is public. Each session ITi, j is identified with a session ID sid which contains 
the identity of user i and user j. The transcript of the message is exchanged between 
user i and user } during the session. Two sessions IT i,'j and IT i, k j are considered to 
be a match if they have the same sid. 
The game runs in two phases. During the first phase, the adversary is allowed to issue 
the following queries in any order:  
Send(IT i,' j, x): if the Send query is allowed, the adversary controls all the 
communication and can cancel and modify the existing messages, insert new ones as 
well. If the Send query is not allowed, the adversary can only passively eavesdrop the 
message sent by the parties after the authenticated communication.  
Reveal master key: by this query, A learns the master key s.  
Reveal ID-based secret: by this query, A learns a user's ID-based key dm.  
Reveal secret value: by this query, A learns a user's long term secret key XU.  
Reveal ephemeral key: by this query, A learns a user's ephemeral secret key rU in 
session ITi, I I  
Replace public key: by this query, A replaces a user's public key Xu to be X, and V 
will use X;; as its public key.  
Reveal session key: by this query, A learns the session key SK of session IT i,'I Once 
the first phase is over, the adversary chooses a fresh session IT i,1j and issues the T 
est(IT i,1j) query.  
Test(ITi,'j): input a fresh session ITi,' j and a bit b E { 0, I} is chosen. If b = 0, the 
adversary is given the session key S K i, 1 j, otherwise, the adversary gets session key 
randomly chosen from the set of the valid session key. 
After the second phase, the adversary outputs a guess fj for b. If fj = b, we consider 
the adversary wins the game, and the advantage that the adversary wins the game is 
defined as: 
 
 
IV. SECURITY PROTOCOL DESIGN 
 
In this section, we propose the preliminaries for the certificateless key agreement 
scheme, and then design a lightweight certificateless key agreement scheme by using 
five following cryptographic primitives. It is noted that this scheme can be easily 
extended and further optimized by one kind of improvement design. Finally, we 
present their proofs on consistency and security. 
 
4.1 Preliminaries 
 
Due to the page limit, we only review part of the definitions and theorems that are 
closely related to our proposed protocol. 
 
Definition: Zq* is multiplicative group, where q is a prime integer; G is a cyclic group 
of prime order q, generated by g; G* = G \ 1, where 1 is the identity of G. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: [12] given ga, gb  G, where a, b   
Z, compute gab. 
Cap Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: [13] given ga, gb, gc   G*, where a, b, c   Z, it 
is easy to decide whether c=ab, but cannot compute a, b. 
Cap Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Signature: [13] let secret key x   Zq*, the public key v = 
gx given x and a message M   {0, 1}*, compute h = H(M), and the signature   = hx , 
where H: {0, 1}*   G*. The verification is to compute h = H(M), and verify that (g, 
v, h,  ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. 
Dual (exponential) Challenge-Response (DCR) signature: [14] let public keys A = ga 
and X = gx, B = gb and Y = gy. The OCR signature (OS) of A and B on message ml, 
m2 is a tuple of values X, Y, and DSA'B' respectively. Here, the same signature can 
be exchanged to compute (and verify) as follows: 
 
where d and e denote H(X, ml) and H(Y, m2). 
Twin Diffe-Hellman  (TDH)  Trapdoor Theorems:  [1 3] using the above notations, 
suppose Xl  E  G'  r, s E Z'  and   :=  g'/X;.  Y,Zj,ZC  are random  variables  in G  and  
defined  as  functions of Xl and X2• Then, I) X2 is uniformly distributed over G; 2) 
Xl and X2 are independent; 3) if Xj  = g"  and Xc  = g", the probability that the value 
of Z Z2  =   Y' does not agree with the  value  of Zj  =  yx,  1\ Z2  =  yxo is  at  most  
I/q (if the latter holds, the former certainly holds). 
 
4.2 Protocol design 
 
In this section, we present a concrete certificateless key agreement scheme for V2V 
communication. The new scheme consists of the following PPT algorithms. 
Setup(lk) :    input  a  security  parameter  1 k, the  RTA runs  the  Setup algorithm as 
following  steps:  determines  (g, q, G),  where  q is  a k-bit  prime, G  is  a  cyclic  
group with  order q and  generator  g,  and  then,  choose  three  hash functions: 
. RTA 
publishes the global parameter param = {q, g, G, H, H1, H2}. 
MasterKeyGen(lk): input a param-secuntyeter 1k,  the RTA chooses sZq, and  
computes S = H(TA)s where TA is the identity of  RTA, s is the master private key  
and public key, respectively. 
ID-basedKeyGen(s, ID): run by the RTA. To register via the RTA, the vehicle sends 
its real identity ID to the RTA. RTA computes the pseudonym ID' and the ID-based 
key for the vehicle. After that, the RTA returns (lD', dID) to the vehicle, where dID is a 
Diffie-Hellman signature by the RTA. 
VerifyID-basedKey: get (lD', dID) from the RTA,   the   vehicle   can   verify   whether 
(  ,  , dID) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple by verifying the key dID. 
SecretValueGen(lk) :   input  a  security  parameter lk, the  vehicle  runs  the algorithm 
to generate the secret value xU,  xU   Zq. The xU is the long-term secret. 
CertijicatelessPublicKeyGen(xij): with the secret value xU, the vehicle runs this 
algorithm to compute the  certificateless  public key xU. 
EphemeralKeyGen(1k) :   input a security parameter 1k, the vehicle chooses rU   Zq, 
and computes RU  =  gru. 
MessageExchange: Before user A and user B run the SessionKeyGen algorithm, they 
exchange the following message: 
 
where, A', B' are the pseudonym identities of the user A and user B, TcurA, TcurB are 
the time-stamps, and LcurA, LcurB are location information. 
SessionKeyGen(sid,  pkA, pkB, skA, skB): input  the  parameters  sid,  pkA, pkB, skA, skB, 
this algorithm returns the session key SK. Here,  sid is the identity of the session, and 
sid = {A', B', EA, EB}, skA = {xA, rA, dA},  pkA = {XA, RA}, skB =  {xB, rB, dB},  pkB =  
{XB, RB}. To generate the session key, A, B do the following computation: 
A computes 
 
B computes 
 
Above computations can be easily verified as: 
 
So the session key SK is: 
),,,,,,,( 76543212 SidHSK   
As mentioned above, we show a proposed certificateless key agreement process, 
which fits for Lippold’s secure model [3]. Further- more, this proposed scheme 
computes more easily and keeps minimization principle from the cryptography 
primitives. 
 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
 
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is secure, practical and 
feasible by analyzing its security properties, computational cost and communication 
overhead. 
 
5.1 Security analysis 
 
We first prove that the proposed certificateless key agreement scheme is secure in 
random oracle under the CDR assumption. The advantage of any PPT, Oli -valued 
adversary A in solving CDH Problem referred in section 4. 1 can be defined as: 
 
And CDH Assumption is: AdvA(k)[CDH] is negligible. 
 
),( ' jiTest i : the input session is fresh [3], and a bit b{0, 1} is randomly chosen. If b 
= 0, the adversary A learns the session key SK, otherwise it randomly chooses a 
session key from the set of valid session keys for A. We say that our certificate less 
authentication key agreement scheme is secure if for any PPT adversary A to guess b 
for 'jj, the advantage A breaks up our scheme is a negligible function of k, which we 
denote as: 
 
Before  ),( ' jiTest i , the  challenger  B tries to  guess  the  test  session,  and  he  
randomly  chooses  two  indices       i, J E  {I, 2,· .    .    q}, tE  {I, 2, .    .    ·    q'}      
and      i *'  J,     i,  J     represent the  i'h and the j’h distinct query.      i,    J' and     t   
denote   the   t,h   test   oracle      ITi, j. Where, q is the most of users, and q' is the 
most sessions. 
So, the probability of B choosing the right i, j is: 
2
1
)1(
1
qqq
  
and then the probability of guess the ji ,
'  correctly is: 
'2
11)],ˆ,ˆ,ˆ(Pr[
qq
ttjjiiB   
Since  there  are  three  secrets  (drm  Xu,  ru) kept  in  each  party,  we  say  that  our  
scheme is  secure  as  long  as  there  is  still  one  secret  unrevealed  for  each  party.   
So there are 9 situations that each party still keeps one secret.  For  the  9  situations,  
there  are 9  strategies  for  B  to  abort  the  game,   illustrated  in  Table  I  and   
AdvA(k)[CDH] > Pr[B(i = i, J = j,t=  t)]Adv(k)[IT].    So,   the advantage of any 
adversary A against our protocol is limited by: 
 
 Table I The Nine Situations and Strategies 
 
 
1) Strategy 1. The adversary learned the ID- based key dr and d.r of party I and J 
through revealing mastered key query or through10- based key query, and also 
learned the secret value Xr and XJ through revealing secret value or replacing the 
public key and X"I through replacing public key query. The only remained secrets  
are  rJ and       So,  the  adversary  has  to guess the right session  IIi,'j  and then to 
solve the CDR problem to compute rA and rB if he wants to compute Al for the 
session key.  So the advantage of the adversary is limited to: 
 
2) Strategy 2: the adversary learned the 10- based key dl and dJ through revealing 
mastered key query  or revealing ID-based key  query of party I and J, and also 
learned  the ephemeral key  rl and  rJ through  revealing  ephemeral key query in 
session IIi, I The unrevealed secrets are Xu and Xu. Therefore, the adversary has to 
guess the right party I and J and then to solve the  CDR  problem  to  compute XI  and 
XJ  if he wants  to  compute A2 for the session key.  So, the advantage is limited by: 
 
3)  Strategy 3 and 4: the adversary learned  the IO-based key dl and dJ through 
revealing mastered key query or revealing ID-based key query of party I and J, 
moreover, the adversary learned the secret value through revealing secret value or 
replacing the public key through replacing public key query of either of party and 
learned the ephemeral key of either party through revealing ephemeral key query in 
session IIi, I Each party keeps a secret of xr/Xu or ru safety. If the adversary wants to 
compute A3 or A4 for the session key, he must guess the right party I and J and the 
right session IIi, j and then to solve the CDR problem. So, the advantage is limited by: 
 
4) Strategy 5 and 6: the adversary learned the IO-based key and secret value of either 
party or replaced the pubic key of either party, and also learned the ephemeral key of 
both parties in session IIi, I. The uncorrupted key of each party is an IO-based key or 
a xu/Xu   or ru.  The adversary has to guess the right party I and J and then to solve the 
DCR signature to compute As if he wants to compute the session key.  So, the 
advantage is limited by: 
 
5) Strategy 7 and 8: the adversary learned the ID-based key and ephemeral key of 
either party, and also learned the secret value or re-placed the public key of both 
parties. The safety secret in each party is an ID-based key or an ephemeral key. The 
adversary has to guess the right party I and J and the right session IIi, j, and then to 
solve the DCR signature to compute A6 if he wants to compute the session key.  So, 
the advantage is limited by: 
 
6) Strategy 9: the adversary learned the secret values and ephemeral keys of both 
parties and replaced the public keys of both parties. The unrevealed secrets are ID-
based keys of both parties. The adversary has to guess the right party I and J and then 
to solve the CDR problem to compute XJ and if he wants to compute A9 for the 
session key. So, the advantage is limited by: 
 
 
5.2 Performance results 
 
In this section, we will evaluate our proposed certificateless key agreement scheme 
from the aspect of efficiency and network performance. 
1) Efficiency Analysis: In this part, we evaluate and compare the performance of our 
protocol with the other protocols, which offer similar security and privacy properties 
even though different schemes were adopted, i.e., discrete logarithm in our protocol 
and elliptic curve cryptosystem in theirs. We measure the computation overhead of 
the following five different operations based on the original source code in the Miracl 
library[15], which is a well-known free software for non-commercial use and 
implements efficient Big Number Cryptography. The experimentation results of the 
crypto overhead are listed in Table II. 
 Table II Crypto Overhead 
 
 
The experiment platform used in this paper is a commodity PC with a dual-core 3.4 
GHz CPU, and 2 GB RAM, and we used the Miracl big number library. Without loss 
of generality, the total computation for each party in our scheme is nine 1024-bit 
modular exponent Modexp operations, four 1024-bit big number multiplication 
Mul1024/prime operations,  two  1024-bit  big number modular addition  ADD/Mod1024  
operations,  and  six  512- bit hash operations.  We compare our protocol with several 
existing CL-AKA protocols we have referred above in Table III. As shown in Figure 
2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, we can see that our scheme have obvious advantage in 
computation efficiency after multi-times key agreement. 
 
Table III Comparison of Different Protocol 
  
 
Fig. 2 Compared with Huang s schemes 
 
 
Fig. 3 Compared with Lippolds schemes 
 
 
Fig. 4 Compared with Song and Yang s schemes 
 
2) Network Performance: In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the 
proposed protocol. There are several metrics that can be used to measure the 
performance of a routing protocol, but we use the most widely accepted ones: the 
packet delivery ratio (PDR), end-to-end delay (E2ED). 
We evaluate the computation overhead of the proposed scheme in NS3 with a cross-
layer weighted position-based routing protocol (CLW PR) [16], which is designed for 
urban VANET environment. CLWPR uses cross-layer information, such as SNIR 
from PRY layer and frame error rate from MAC layer to improve the efficiency of 
routing. 
The scenario is a 5x5 Manhattan Grid network with 200 nodes, with mean speed 
varying from 0 to 35mls in bonnmotion-2.0[17]. For each scenario, 10 concurrent 
connections are created in NS3.11 using UDP connections to get the PDR, E2ED, hop 
counts and total dropped packets. We run several Monte Car- lo simulations, and use 
50 different mobility trace files for each scenario. Each vehicle is equipped with a 
proper wireless interface. The communication range is set to be 500m according to the 
IEEE 802.11p standard with RTS/CTS mechanism and the used propagation model is 
Two-Ray-Ground. 
The results are shown in Figure 5, Figure 6. In both figures, the x-axis indicates the 
mean speed of the 200 vehicles in the scenario. In each figure, there are three curves, 
the red line with + point stands for the PDR or E2ED of the CLWPR protocol without 
our proposed secure key agreement scheme, the green line with x point stands for the 
PDR or E2ED of the CLWPR protocol with our proposed secure key agreement 
scheme, and the time of our scheme is computed by the naive algorithm in Miracle, 
the last curve of blue line with x point is the PDR or E2ED of the CLWPR protocol 
with our proposed secure key agreement scheme testing in the comba algorithm in 
Miracle. 
 
 
Fig.5 Packet delivery rate results 
 
In Figure 5, the y-axis indicates the pack- age delivery rate, which means the ratio of 
the number of delivered data packet to the destination. This illustrates the level of 
delivered data to the destination. 
 
From Figure 5, we can see that the three curves are very similar, and they are nearly 
overlapped.  Therefore, the proposed scheme does not decrease the packet delivery 
rate and does not add much network overhead. 
In Figure 6, the y-axis indicates the end- to-end delay, E2ED means the average time 
taken by a data packet to arrive in the destination. It also includes the delay caused by 
route discovery process and the queue in data packet transmission. Only these data 
packets are successfully delivered to destinations count. 

 
sconnectionofNumber
timesendtimearrive
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 Fig.6 End-ta-end delay results 
 
From Figure 6, we can see that the pro- posed scheme increases a little extra end-to- 
end delay, but the addition in E2ED is negligible because the three curves are quite 
close. We can conclude that our proposed certificate- less key agreement scheme is 
efficient which shows a good network performance.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we focus on a practical and safe certificateless key agreement scheme 
special to secure V2V communication without available RSU. Firstly, we utilize Gap 
Diffie-Heilman Signature for RTA to sign the ID-based key dID, which makes it 
possible to build our scheme free from a secure channel between RTA and vehicles. 
Secondly, considering securing forward property, the ephemeral key pairs, i.e., rU and 
RU, which is only used in one certain key exchange process, is embedded into the 
session key. Thirdly, in order to enhance the efficiency and robustness of the proposed 
scheme, we embed DCR signature in session key evidences and reduced the key 
agreement interactions to one-round. Finally, we evaluate the computational cost and 
the network overhead of the proposed scheme by the existing routing protocol 
CLWPR in NS3. Besides that, we also use the classical reduction approach to prove 
that the proposed scheme is secure as long as there is still one secret uncompromised 
in the random oracle model. Performance comparisons with other schemes show that 
our proposed key agreement schemes are efficient and suitable for vehicle-to-vehicle 
authentication communication services. 
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